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Employer-ﬁnanced health insurance systems, like that used in the United States, distort ﬁrms’ labor
demand and adversely affect the economy. Since such costs vary with employment rather than hours
worked, ﬁrms have an incentive to increase output by increasing worker hours rather than employment.
Given that the returns to employment exceed the returns to hours worked, this results in lower levels of
employment and output. In this paper we construct a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model
where individuals differ with respect to their productivity and employment opportunities. Calibrat-
ing the model to the U.S. economy, we generate steady state results for several alternative models for
ﬁnancing health insurance: one in which health insurance is ﬁnanced primarily through employer con-
tributions that vary with employment; a second where insurance is funded through a non-distortionary,
lump-sum tax; and a third where insurance is funded by a payroll tax. We measure the effects of each
of the alternatives on output, employment, hours worked and inequality.
JEL Codes: E62, O41, C68
Keywords:1 Introduction
Employer-￿nanced health insurance systems, like that used in the United States,
distort ￿rms￿labor demand and adversely a⁄ect the economy. Unlike most de-
veloped countries, health insurance in the United States has long been ￿nanced
primarily through employers. de Navas-Walt, Proctor and Mills (2004) report
that about 60 percent of Americans obtain health insurance through employers,
though this percentage has been steadily declining for decades. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005), healthcare costs now represent over 7
percent of the average employer￿ s total compensation costs. Since such costs
vary only with employment rather than hours worked, ￿rms have an incentive
to increase worker hours rather than employment.
While it is clear that the costs of providing health insurance are signi￿cant,
little attention has been paid to quantifying the macroeconomic consequences
of employer-based health insurance (EBHI) systems. The literature is clear on
the fact that EBHI a⁄ects labor market outcomes. Cutler and Madrian (1998)
found that rising healthcare costs accounted for up to a 3 percent increase in
hours worked in the U.S. during the 1980s. More recently, Baiker and Chandra
(2005) estimated that rising insurance premiums led to an 8 percent decline
in employment between 1996-2002. Given these labor market distortions, it
is possible that the U.S.￿ s reliance on employer-funded health insurance is re-
ducing macroeconomic output. Furthermore, these distortions may also have
implications for wage inequality.
In this paper we attempt to quantify the macroeconomic consequences of
alternative models for ￿nancing healthcare. Speci￿cally, we address two ques-
tions: one, what are the distortionary costs of the U.S.￿ s existing EBHI system?
and two, what would be the macroeconomic impact of adopting a single-payer,
universal healthcare system? To address these questions, we construct a hetero-
geneous agent general equilibrium model where individuals di⁄er with respect
to their productivity and employment opportunities. Each period ￿rms make
a decision as to how many workers of each type to hire, as well as a decision
on hours per worker. The benchmark model is calibrated to match the most
pertinent aspects of the U.S. economy. From the benchmark model, aggre-
gate employment, output and asset distribution are computed and compared
to those generated from a number of alternative models where health insurance
is funded at the national level through either a lump-sum tax on employers or
payroll taxes. The results of these experiments have important implications for
ongoing policy debates over healthcare reform.
22 Health Insurance and Employment
Provision of health insurance by employers can a⁄ect labor market outcomes for
a number of reasons. This can occur through either productivity,1 labor supply,2
or through changes in the structure of employment driven by employers￿de-
mand. Because of the empirical controversy surrounding the e⁄ects on produc-
tivity and labor supply, this paper focuses only on simulating the demand-side
e⁄ects. Speci￿cally, we concentrate on the ￿rm￿ s choice regarding its optimal
levels of employment and the number of hours worked.
The ￿rst issue related to the provision of health insurance and the demand
for labor is whether ￿rms are able to shift the cost of providing health insurance
to their employees in the form of lower wages. In other words, rising healthcare
costs for ￿rms might simply result in a reduction in wages. If ￿rms could
make this shift, the cost of providing health insurance bene￿ts would have a
negligible e⁄ect on labor demand, and no e⁄ect on the hours-employment trade-
o⁄. However, this does not appear to be the case. As Currie and Madrian (1999)
conclude, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that a trade-o⁄ between
insurance costs and wages exists. Overall, the literature indicates that EBHI
systems like that of the U.S. do in fact raise the costs of production. Speci￿cally,
EBHI a⁄ects the costs associated with hiring labor services.
The salient feature of EBHI is that the costs vary with the level of employ-
ment rather than the number of hours worked. The implication is that these
costs should a⁄ect the overall structure of employment, leading ￿rms to hire
fewer workers to work more hours. The existing literature appears to support
just such a trade-o⁄(Ehrenberg 1971, Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982, Beaulieu
1995, and Cutler and Madrian 1998). In fact, Cutler and Madrian (1998) found
that rising health insurance costs accounted for a signi￿cant increase in hours
worked in the U.S. during the 1980s, while Baiker and Chandra (2005) found
that rising insurance premiums led to a large decline in employment between
1996-2002.
Overall, the evidence from the literature suggests that EBHI systems increase
￿rms￿costs. As a result, ￿rms reduce their demand for the number of workers
while increasing their demand for hours worked per employee. The implication
is that if ￿rms could reduce the costs associated with employment, the demand
1Health insurance reduces the cost of health. Ultimately, health has been shown to a⁄ect
labor productivity. However, the empirical literature on the relationship between insurance
and health is mixed. For the purposes of this paper, we ignore the possibility of any such
productivity e⁄ects. For an overview of this literature, see Currie and Madrian (1999).
2When the provision of health insurance is tied to employment, it a⁄ects workers￿supply
of labor by increasing the returns to work. Since the elasticity of labor supply for men and
single women in the United States is relatively inelastic, the literature on the relationship be-
tween health insurance and labor participation rates have concentrated on retirees (Blau and
Gilleskie 2001), poor women (Yelowitz 1995), and married women (Olsen 1998, Buchmueller
and Valletta 1999). Overall, the labor supply e⁄ects of EBHI systems appear mixed. While
older workers and married women are more likely to work when insurance is tied to employ-
ment, there are ine¢ ciencies in the system. Because low-paying jobs often fail to provide
insurance, poor women are actually less likely to enter the labor market since they would risk
losing Medicaid.
3for workers would increase and the hours worked would decrease. Furthermore,
if the returns to employment exceed the returns to hours worked, such a change
would have important implications for the level of domestic output.
3 The Model
The literature has implications for the macroeconomic model developed in this
section. First, it is clear that EBHI imposes a distortionary ￿employment tax￿
on producers. Firms respond to EBHI by altering the structure of employment,
substituting more hours for fewer workers. We begin to analyze the macroeco-
nomic e⁄ects of EBHI by constructing a simple, yet realistic model of the U.S.
economy. Since the primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the macro-
economic e⁄ects generated by changes in employment from moving away from
the current EBHI system, we ignore the potential productivity gains related
to worker health and reductions in job-lock. For tractability, we also abstract
from gender and marital status e⁄ects. We also assume that all workers prefer
to work full time. In the benchmark model employers provide full health in-
surance bene￿ts for an exogenously determined percentage of the workers they
employ, regardless of the number of hours they work.
3.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of ex ante heterogeneous
workers. Workers di⁄er with respect to their age and their human capital (skill
level). We assume three di⁄erent types of human capital denoted by hc 2
{hc1;hc2;hc3}, where hc1 through hc3 represent monotonically increasing hu-
man capital levels.
Individuals are assumed to live J periods with certainty and each period
a new generation is born. The fraction of individuals age j and human cap-




hc=1 ￿j;hc = 1: Each individual par-
ticipates in the labor force beginning in period 1, and must retire from work
in period jret, where jret < J. Therefore, individuals￿ages are indexed by
j 2 f1;2;::;jret;::;Jg. Given that this model focuses on the distortions related
to a system of employer-based heath insurance, and ￿rms are typically not re-
quired to pay health insurance costs for former employees or retirees (with the
exception of Medicaid costs which are included in the calibration of payroll
taxes), the inclusion of retirement in the model should not impact the main
employment results. However, it does indirectly a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions. The
inclusion of a retiree cohort acts as another channel through which to moti-
vate savings, and thereby has an important impact on households￿consump-
tion/savings decisions throughout the life cycle, and by extention on the level
of capital stock formation.
Each period prior to retirement, individuals face uncertainty relating to
whether or not they will become employed and, if employed, whether or not
they will receive health bene￿ts. The probability of employment is determined
4endogenously in the model based on the demand for employment by ￿rms.
Speci￿cally, the probability of employment di⁄ers across human capital types
and is exactly equal to the percentage of workers that ￿rms choose to employ
in each period (for each type of worker). For example, if ￿rms choose to hire
only 60 percent of the low-human-capital type workers avaliable for employ-
ment, then the probability of employment for all low-human-capital workers is
set equal to 0.60. The probability of receiving healthcare from an employer is
calibrated exogenously to mimic the percentage of workers who currently receive
employer-based health insurance. In the face of this idiosyncratic uncertainly,
individuals choose the vector fcj;hj;aj+1g in order to maximize their expected
lifetime utility, which depends on the consumption of a good and the amount







where cj;hc is the consumption of goods and lj;hc is the amount of leisure time
for an individual of age j and human capital hc. ￿ represents utility derived
from the consumption of health insurance and is assumed to be constant across
agent types. For simplicity, we also assume that the value of ￿ is independent
of the provider; that is, workers have no preference between employer-based or
government-provided health insurance. But not all individuals in the model
receive health insurance. For those individuals who do not receive health insur-
ance either from their employer or the government, ￿ = 1: For those individ-
uals o⁄ered employer-based health bene￿ts, or for those individuals receiving
government-provided health insurance, ￿ > 1: ￿ is the subjective discount
factor, and E is the expectation operator.
The momentary utility function has the form:
U(cj;hc;￿;lj;hc) = log(c￿
j;hc￿1￿￿) + ￿j;hc(lj;hc) (2)
where ￿ represents the relative importance of consumption, and ￿j;hc represents
the utility gained from leisure time. Individuals are assumed to be endowed
with one unit of time each period to be allocated between leisure and work.
That is,
1 = lj;hc + hj;hc (3)
where hj;hc represents the number of hours an individual of age j and human
capital hc spends working. The utility derived from leisure is written as:
￿j;hc(lj;hc) = ￿hc log(1 ￿ hj;hc) (4)
where ￿hc is a human capital-dependent parameter representing an individual￿ s
preference for leisure.
3.2 E¢ ciency and Employment of Worker-Agents
The large number of ex ante heterogeneous agents di⁄er with respect to their
productivity or e¢ ciency in the labor market. E¢ ciency is human capital de-
5pendent and is denoted "hc: The wage rate for each type of worker will be
determined by simultaneously solving the ￿rst-order conditions from both the
￿rm and the individual￿ s choice problems and is denoted whc: An employed in-
dividual of human capital type hc receives the wage income whc for each hour
worked. If an individual is in the unemployed state (denoted u), he receives
unemployment insurance bene￿ts. We denote the unemployment bene￿t by ￿:
Retirees receive the retirement bene￿t !:
The demand for labor depends on human capital levels and is denoted nhc,
indicating the demand for labor of human capital level hc: During the working
years, the probability of drawing the employed state (denoted e) is endogenously
calibrated to match the demand for employment by ￿rms and hence is also
dependent upon the worker￿ s human capital level.
3.3 Aggregate Technology
The production technology of this economy is given by a standard Cobb-Douglas
function:
Y = f(K;N) = AK￿N(1￿￿) (5)
where ￿ 2 (0,1) is capital￿ s share of output, and K; N are the aggregate inputs
of capital and labor, respectively. The parameter A represents total factor
productivity and is assumed constant. The capital stock depreciates at the
rate ￿ each period. Aggregate employment in the model, N, follows that of
Fitzgerald (1997) and is de￿ned as the measure of labor services of employed





where again "hc represents the relative e¢ ciency of a type hc worker, nhc is
the number of type hc individuals employed by the ￿rm, hhc is the number of
hours an employed type hc individual works, and
P3
hc=1 "hc = 1. Following
Fitzgerald (1997) and Fitzory and Hart (1985), we introduce the parameter
 hc to represent the elasticity of labor services with respect to hours for each
human capital type. If  hc = 1, this implies that labor services for agents of
human capital type hc are proportional to hours worked, whereas if  hc < 1
(as it is calibrated in our model) labor services increase less than proportionally
with hours worked. The latter case is typical in the labor demand literature
and can be interpreted as the decreasing returns to hours often resulting from
worker fatigue or boredom. We de￿ne aggregate employment as multiplicative
in e¢ ciency units of workers in order to allow for complementarity across human
capital types. For simplicity, we assume there are no productivity di⁄erences
between workers that do and do not receive healthcare bene￿ts from the ￿rm.
Given a competitive environment, the pro￿t-maximizing behavior of the ￿rm
gives rise to the ￿rst-order condition that determines the real (net) return to
capital.
r(K;N;h) = ￿AK(￿￿1)N(1￿￿) ￿ ￿: (7)
63.4 Individuals￿Decision Problem
An individual enters a period knowing their human capital level, employment
opportunities, probability of obtaining healthcare, and asset position for the
period. We let aj 2 A represent the initial asset position of an individual. We
restrict aj to the discrete set of positive values {a1;a2;:::;aA}. Each period,
individuals choose the vector fcj;hj;aj+1g to maximize their utility. For each
individual, the individual￿ s state depends on their age, j, their human capital
level, hc, asset position, a, and employment situation, s. ￿s represents the
probability that an individual will receive health insurance and is dependent
upon an individual￿ s employment status, s. For an employed individual (s = e)
of working age, ￿e < 1 and is calibrated to match the percentage of workers
who currently receive health insurance either from their employer or through the
government (typically veterans￿insurance or Medicaid). Since typically not all
unemployed individuals receive health bene￿ts through the government, ￿u < 1
as well, and is calibrated to match the percentage of unemployed individuals who
receive Medicaid or some other type of government provided health insurance.
Since all retirees are eligible to receive government provided healthcare through
Medicare, the probability of receiving health insurance in the model when j >
jret is denoted ￿r and is set equal to 1.
In addition, ￿u represents the unemployment tax rate. This tax is set so that
the revenue collected exactly covers the total cost of unemployment bene￿ts, ￿,
and is ￿nanced by equally taxing both workers and ￿rms. Therefore, each
individual￿ s wage income is taxed at a rate of 0:5￿u: Similarly, retirement
bene￿ts, !, are paid to each individual past retirement age. These bene￿ts are
￿nanced by equally taxing both workers and ￿rms at the tax rate ￿r:
The choice problem for each individual can be expressed as:
V (j;a;hc;s) = max[￿sU(￿;￿ > 1) + (1 ￿ ￿s)U(￿;￿ = 1)] +
￿
Z












￿ ￿ + (1 + r)a; if j < jret, and s = u (9b)
c + a
0






The decision rules for c, h and a
0
for individual i are Ci(x); Hi(x); and Ai(x):
3.5 Firm￿ s Decision Problem
Each homogeneous ￿rm rents capital and employs workers. The ￿rm incurs
two types of costs that vary only with the level of employment, ￿ and ￿: Each
of these costs represent a portion of the costs of hiring an additional employee.
In particular, ￿ represents the cost of providing healthcare per worker, while ￿
represents all other per worker costs, including training costs, search and pa-
perwork costs, and other bene￿ts (excluding healthcare). Note that since ￿rms
do not o⁄er healthcare bene￿ts to all workers, the parameter ￿ is introduced
to represent the percentage of workers who are provided healthcare through
the ￿rm. Currently, only 70.5% of all workers obtain their healthcare bene￿ts
through their employer.3
In addition, ￿rms incur variable costs associated with worker hours in the
form of payroll taxes. Each ￿rm must pay a tax rate of ￿b for each worker-hour
employed. That is, if a ￿rm hires a type 1 worker to work 20% of their total time
allotment, the e⁄ective cost of those hours to the ￿rm is (1 + ￿b)w1 ￿ 0:2: The
revenue from these payroll taxes goes into a government savings fund.4 Firms
must also pay a portion of the tax rates ￿u and ￿r to ￿nance unemployment
bene￿ts and retirement bene￿ts respectively. Since these bene￿ts are ￿nanced
by equally taxing both workers and ￿rms, the e⁄ective tax rates for the ￿rm are
0:5￿u and 0:5￿r.
Each period ￿rms must choose both the number of workers of each human
capital type, nhc, as well as the number of hours that each type of worker will




yt ￿ rtkt ￿ [(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)
3 X
hc=1







As noted earlier, the ￿rst-order conditions of this maximization problem
deliver the real return to capital as well as an equilibrium condition for hours
worked for each type of worker.
3Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2006.
4Note that the payroll tax in the benchmark model acts purely as an additional (variable)
cost to ￿rms and is an attempt to mimic the social security and other payroll taxes paid by
employers in the U.S.
83.6 The Government
3.6.1 In the benchmark model
The government is constructed in such as way as to mimic the most salient
features of the U.S. tax system, and allows us to analyze the e⁄ects of a change
in healthcare costs to employers through taxes. In the benchmark economy the
government provides unemployment bene￿ts to non-working individuals, retire-
ment bene￿ts to all individuals past retirement age, and ￿ other programs￿that
are assumed to bene￿t each agent equally. We assume both the unemploy-
ment bene￿ts program and the retirement bene￿ts program are self-￿nanced
by equally taxing both workers and ￿rms. The unemployment tax rate, ￿u;
is set so that the revenue collected covers the cost of paying each unemployed
individual the amount ￿: Similarly, the retirement tax rate, ￿r; is set so that the
revenue collected covers the cost of paying each retired individual the amount






























The payroll taxes paid by ￿rms in the benchmark model are set to replicate
the legally-required wage related taxes (minus unemployment insurance) faced
by ￿rms. The revenue from these taxes, G, is assumed to ￿nance other govern-
ment programs which are assumed to bene￿t all agents equally. In addition, G
also includes spending on government-provided health insurance. This includes
an exogenously set fraction of unemployed workers and employed workers. Like
EBHI, the bene￿ts from government-provided health insurance enter the agents￿
utility function through ￿. More speci￿cally, the government budget constraint
in the benchmark model can be de￿ned as:






3.6.2 When healthcare costs are funded by a lump-sum tax
Since one of the main purposes of the paper is to measure the distortionary
e⁄ects of EBHI, we estimate an alternative model where the ￿rm￿ s EBHI costs
are instead replaced by a lump-sum tax, T, paid to the government. This
alternative version allows us to compare the macroeconomic outcomes under
EBHI with those generated under a non-distortionary, single-payer system. In
addition to unemployment bene￿ts and other programs, the government also




yt ￿ rtkt ￿ [(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)
3 X
hc=1







Consequently, the new government budget constraint becomes





[nhchj;hcwhc] + T: (15)
where T = ￿￿
P3
hc=1 nhc from equation (10) in the benchmark model. The
reason for determining T this way is to avoid altering the relative burden of
￿nancing health insurance when comparing systems. Although this calibration
of T does not estimate the lump-sum costs of moving to a universal health-
care system, maintaining constant relative costs allows us to isolate the pure
distortion e⁄ects when we compare the benchmark to the lump-sum model.
3.6.3 When universal healthcare is ￿nanced through a payroll tax
The second question addressed in this paper concerns the macroeconomic con-
sequences of adopting a single-payer, universal healthcare system. While the
lump-sum model allows us to measure the size of the distortion e⁄ects that result
from EBHI, it does not represent an administratively feasible policy alternative.
Universal coverage ￿nanced through a payroll tax is quite realistic. In fact, this
is essentially what is done in Germany.
In this alternative model, in addition to the legally-required wage related
taxes ￿rms face, they also incur an additional payroll tax, denoted ￿h: Obvi-
ously, this tax can be split between ￿rms and individuals. We actually estimate
two versions of the model: one where ￿rms are required to pay 100 percent of
the tax obligation, and a second where the tax is split equally between both
workers and ￿rms (similar to the unemployment tax). This new system is self-
￿nancing so that the revenue collected from this tax exactly covers the total













In the experiment where the healthcare tax is split equally between both
workers and ￿rms, the individuals￿choice problem now becomes:
V (j;a;hc;s) = maxU(￿;￿ > 1) + ￿
Z












￿ ￿ + (1 + r)a; if j < jret, and s = u (18b)
c + a
0
￿ ! + (1 + r)a; if j ￿ jret: (18c)
Similarly, the new ￿rm￿ s problem is:
max
 
yt ￿ rtkt ￿ [(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + 0:5￿h + ￿b)
3 X
hc=1







Note that in this version of the model, since healthcare costs are ￿nanced
through a payroll tax which is dependent upon the level of employment, the
cost burden may not be identical to the benchmark/lump-sum versions of the
model. Whereas the lump-sum version of the model is cost-neutral, the same is
not true when health insurance is ￿nanced through a payroll tax. This is due
to the fact that when the ￿rm decides to increase (decrease) employment as a
result of the change in its cost structure, its tax burden will increase (decrease)
accordingly.
Regardless, comparing the payroll tax model to the lump-sum model will
provide us some measure of the distortion caused by this more feasible policy
alternative relative to the no-distortion, (albeit unrealistic) lump-sum model.
Comparing the universal model ￿nanced through payroll deductions to the
benchmark model, of course, allows us to address one of the most fundamental
questions of national health insurance reform.
3.7 Determination of Wages and Hours
The wage rate for each worker of human capital type hc is dependent on the
equilibrium hours worked, and is determined by simultaneously solving both the
individual￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s choice problem. In particular, the individual￿ s opti-




￿(1 ￿ hhc)(1 ￿ 0:5￿u ￿ 0:5￿r)
(20)
where again, ￿hc is the leisure preference and chc is the level of consumption,
each for an agent of human capital type hc.







(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)whcnhc
(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)whchhc + (￿￿ + ￿)
: (21)
11This condition states the familiar outcome that the ratio of the marginal
products of the two inputs (i.e. hours per worker, and the number of workers)
must equal the ratio of the marginal costs. In addition, since @Y
@hhc =  "hc(1 ￿
￿) Y
hhc and @Y
@nhc = "hc(1 ￿ ￿) Y
nhc; equation (21) yields a solution for equilibrium
hours worked which is independent of employment. In particular, the ￿rm￿ s
problem gives rise to the following solution for hours:
hhc =
 (￿￿ + ￿)
whc(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)(1 ￿  )
: (22)
Combining the equilibrium conditions from both the individual￿ s and the
￿rm￿ s optimization problems (equations 20 and 22 respectively) yields the solu-
tion for equilibrium hours worked:
h￿
hc =
 ￿(￿￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ 0:5￿u ￿ 0:5￿r)
￿hcchc(1 + 0:5￿u + 0:5￿r + ￿b)(1 ￿  ) +  ￿(￿￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ 0:5￿u ￿ 0:5￿r)
:
(23)
While these equilibrium conditions hold for the benchmark model, equi-
librium conditions for the two alternative models will di⁄er slightly. Under
lump-sum ￿nancing of health insurance ￿ = 0 in equations 22 and 23. Un-
der payroll-tax ￿nancing where ￿h is split evenly between ￿rms and individuals
equilibrium hours worked becomes:
h￿0
hc=
 ￿￿(1 ￿ 0:5￿u ￿ 0:5￿r ￿ 0:5￿h)




Given a set of ￿scal policy arrangements {￿;!;￿u;;￿r;￿b;￿h}, a stationary equi-
librium includes: the value function Vi(x); a set of individual decision rules
Ci(x), Ai(x); and Hi(x); and prices for both labor and capital, fw1;w2;w3;rg.
Each of these are determined in an environment where: individuals and ￿rms
maximize utility subject to budget constraints as expressed in equations (8) -
(10); the government budget constraint is satis￿ed; the various markets clear;
and the cross-sectional distribution measure, ￿(x), is time invariant. Formally,
the following conditions must be satis￿ed in equilibrium.



















12(ii) Employment rates are endogenously determined by the choices of ￿rms.
(iii) The relative prices fw1;w2;w3;rg solve both the individual￿ s as well as
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t-maximization problem by satisfying equations (8) through (10).
(iv) Given the time-invariant government policy variables, the relative wage
rate, interest rate and employment rate yield individual policy rules Ci(x), A(x)
and Hi(x) which solve the programming problem of the individual as de￿ned in
(8).
(v) The various markets clear at the prices fw1;w2;w3;rg.





￿j;hcC(x)d￿(x) + [K0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K] + G = f(K;N;h): (25)













￿j;3H3(x)d￿(j;hc = 3;￿) (28)
where the left-hand side of each market clearing equation represents the total
demand of type hc worker-hours determined by the ￿rms￿pro￿t-maximizing
￿rst-order conditions, and the right-hand side represents the total supply of
type hc hours determined from the individuals￿utility-maximizing ￿rst-order
conditions.
(vii) The government￿ s budget constraint equation is satis￿ed.
4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to mimic steady-state data for the United States. These
involve production technology, labor-related costs and consumer preferences.
The parameters that describe steady-state production come from calibration
targets consistent with recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005,
2006a, 2006b) and existing literature.
4.1 Targets
All of the key parameters that drive the model￿ s most important results have
been calibrated using empirical targets. These include the relative e¢ ciencies,
13leisure preferences, the marginal product of hours worked, and most employment-
related costs. The bene￿t of using these calibration targets is that it allows us
to endogenously calibrate certain parameters so that our benchmark model cor-
rectly mimics certain characteristics consistent with the U.S. economy.
Targets for employment and hours worked come from the Current Population
Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006b). Type 1 workers are those with
a high school diploma or less; type 2 workers are those with some post-high
school education; type 3 workers are those with a four-year college degree or
higher. Targets for relative wages are determined by the median usual weekly
earnings for full time workers by education level (Bureau of Labor Statistics
2006a). Note that one cannot simply divide this by the average hours worked
per week to obtain an estimate of the average hourly wages, since the hours
worked ￿gures also include part-time employees. Nevertheless, the earnings
estimates for full time workers provide a reasonable target for establishing the
relative wages for each type of worker (1.000, 1.242 and 1.896, respectively).
Targets for employment, hours worked and relative wages are summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration Targets for Employment
Variable BLS data Target
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5456 0.5456
Type 2 worker 0.6860 0.6860
Type 3 worker 0.7597 0.7597
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 37.34 hrs/wk 0.2220
Type 2 worker 39.17 hrs/wk 0.2330
Type 3 worker 42.45 hrs/wk 0.2530
Relative Wages
Type 1 worker $543 week 1.0000
Type 2 worker $674 week 1.2420
Type 3 worker $817 week 1.8960
Targets for production costs come from a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics￿
(2005) report on Employer costs for employee compensation. There are three
key costs that a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s optimal decisions in our model: (1) the per-worker
cost of health insurance; (2) legally-required wage-related taxes (e.g., FICA);
and (3) other costs related to the level of employment (e.g., search costs, other
bene￿ts, etc.). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005) estimates that costs for
employee health insurance per hour worked accounts for 7.5 percent of total
worker compensation; legally-required bene￿ts per hour worked (not including
unemployment insurance) account for another 7.5 percent of total worker com-
pensations; and other costs of employment such as paid leave, vacation, sick
and holiday leave per hour worked account for another 7.2 percent of total
worker compensation. Unfortunately, this 7.2 percent does not include other
non-compensation costs associated with hiring. For example, Fitzgerald (1996)
14cites costs like training, search, and paperwork costs. While there are few di-
rect estimates of these costs, the seminal paper by Oi (1962) ￿nds these hiring
costs are equivalent to about 5 percent of total compensation costs. But that
estimate was based on data from the 1950s, a time when most jobs tended to
be concentrated in lower-skilled manufacturing jobs where the training and/or
search costs tend to be lower. Since we have reason to expect these costs to be
far higher in the 21st century, we assume 5 percent represents a lower bound.
More recent research supports these presumptions. Using data on Italian ￿rms,
Del Boca and Rota (1998) estimates hiring costs to range between 16 to 22 per-
cent of total compensation. As they note, there is reason to believe that, due to
more stringent government regulations, Italian ￿rms￿hiring costs are probably
among the highest in the world.
Given these data, we assume search and hiring costs to be 10 percent of
total worker compensation in our benchmark model. As a result, we calibrate
all employment-related costs that are not related to health insurance to be 17.2
percent (7.2 percent + 10 percent) of total worker compensation costs. As will
become evident in the results that follow, the calibration of these parameter
largely determines the magnitude of the responses to the counterfactual exper-
iments. In the ￿nal section, we report results of sensitivity analysis of our
experiments to the estimate of these hiring costs.
4.2 Benchmark Model
Given the targets discussed above, the benchmark model is calibrated using the
parameters listed in Table 2. The marginal product of capital (and employ-
ment) comes from recent work by Cassou and Lansing (2004). In their analysis
of the output e⁄ects of a ￿ at tax, they assume that the marginal product of
capital (￿) is 0.36 and the marginal product of labor services (1 ￿ ￿) is 0.64.
The relative e¢ ciency of workers at each age is estimated using data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics on average income by age (Platania and Schlagen-
hauf 2004). The proportion (￿) of each type of worker is obtained from data
on average weekly earnings of full time workers by education level (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2006a). Recall that type 1 workers are de￿ned to be those with
a high-school education or less; type 2 workers have some college education, but
do not posses a degree from a four-year college; type 3 workers are those with
at least a college degree.
The level of human capital (hc), marginal product of hours ( ) and the
leisure preferences (￿) for each of the three types of workers are calibrated to
hit the targets set for employment, hours worked and relative wages given in
Table 1. The values for the cost of healthcare per worker (￿), legally-required
wage-related bene￿ts (￿b) and other costs of employment (￿) are chosen to
match the actual employer costs reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2005) discussed above. The percent of income that is paid to unemployed
workers (￿) is based on the average wages weekly bene￿ts paid and the average
duration of unemployment as of 2003 (U.S. Department of Labor 2004), while
the percent of income that is paid to retirees (!) is based on the average social
15security retirement bene￿t paid to workers. Finally, the rate of time preference
(￿) is from Altig, et al (2001).
Table 2: Benchmark Parameters
Symbol Description Value
Production Technology
A Technology Scalar 1.0000
￿ Marginal product of capital 0.3600
￿ Relative e¢ ciency of workers at each age see appendix
￿ Relative size of age cohorts see appendix
￿1 Proportion of type 1 workers 0.3887
￿2 Proportion of type 2 workers 0.2782
￿3 Proportion of type 3 workers 0.3331
"1 Relative e¢ ciency of type 1 workers 0.2340
"2 Relative e¢ ciency of type 2 workers 0.2640
"3 Relative e¢ ciency of type 3 workers 0.5020
 1 Marginal product of hours for type 1 workers 0.7186
 2 Marginal product of hours for type 2 workers 0.7756
 3 Marginal product of hours for type 3 workers 0.8440
Employment and Wage Costs
￿ Cost related to provision of health insurance 0.0193
￿b Legally required wage-related costs 0.0880
￿ Other employment-related costs 0.0313
￿ Percentage of workers who receive EBHI 0.7050
￿ Percent of wages paid to unemployed workers 0.1170
! Percent of wages paid to retired workers 0.4200
Utility Function
￿ Time preference 0.9960
￿1 Leisure preference for type 1 workers 5.6330
￿2 Leisure preference for type 2 workers 4.5480
￿3 Leisure preference for type 3 workers 3.8160
￿e Proportion of employed workers with insurance 0.8272
￿u Proportion of unemployed workers with insurance 0.7382
5 Results
5.1 Benchmark Model
Using the parameters in Table 2 we simulate a benchmark model that targets
the most important features of the employment/hours decision in the U.S. The
results of this benchmark model - matching all the targeted values for employ-
ment, hours, and relative wages de￿ned in Table 1 - generate the results shown
in Table 3 for wages, consumption, capital stock and output.
16Table 3: Benchmark Results
Variable Simulated value
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.4544
Type 2 worker 0.5858
Type 3 worker 0.8438
Average Consumption
Type 1 worker 0.0508
Type 2 worker 0.0798




With a benchmark economy in place, we are now able to address our two ques-
tions: (1) what are the distortionary costs of the U.S.￿ s existing EBHI system?
and (2) what would be the consequences of adopting a single-payer, universal
healthcare system? In addition to analyzing the e⁄ects of these alternative
systems on the demand for both worker-hours and employment, the output and
distributional e⁄ects of EBHI can also be estimated.
5.2.1 Current coverage funded by a lump-sum tax
In this version of the model, the per-worker cost of providing health insurance
is removed. Instead, health insurance is now provided by a single payer, the
government. In this experiment the relative burden remains unchanged; ￿rms
will pay the same amount in the form of a new lump-sum tax as they paid in
total health insurance costs in the benchmark model (T = ￿￿
P3
hc=1 nhc). All
this does is transform the cost of providing health insurance into a ￿xed cost
rather than a marginal cost per worker. Based on the results from this model,
we can directly measure the size of the distortion caused by EBHI.
Results from this counterfactual experiment are given in Table 4. As ex-
pected, the experiment shows a signi￿cant increase in employment rates across
the distribution of agent-types. Moreover, this labor-demand e⁄ect is strongest
for workers with lower levels of human capital. The distribution of hours worked
also shifts in favor of the low-productivity workers. While hours worked de-
creases for all workers, it declines most for type 1 workers. Recall that in
the benchmark economy the costs associated with hiring workers gives ￿rms a
greater incentive to hire the most productive workers and work them for longer
hours. Under the lump-sum tax, ￿rms now have a greater incentive to hire
additional workers. This is because the marginal productivity of workers is
greater than the marginal productivity of hours for all levels of human capital.
In the benchmark model, any increase in productivity gained when hiring addi-
tional workers is o⁄set by the higher costs associated with hiring, a large part
17of which were driven by health insurance. Hence, under the lump-sum tax,
hours worked decreases substantially for each type of worker and employment
increases.
Just as important as the employment results are the implications for in-
equality. Even though absolute wages for all workers decrease due to the
signi￿cant decrease in hours worked, wages decline the most for type 2 and 3
workers. Therefore, as can be seen in Table 4, overall wage inequality between
the higher and lower-skilled workers declines signi￿cantly under the lump-sum
alternative. This improvement in relative equality is also seen in the change
in consumption rates. Type 1 workers experience an improvement in their
total consumption levels while consumption declines slightly for types 2 and 3
workers. Overall, consumption increases for the lower-skilled workers relative
to their higher-skilled counterparts.
Table 4: Lump-Sum Tax Results
Variable Benchmark Lump Sum % Change
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5463 0.8722 46.78%
Type 2 worker 0.6867 0.9999 37.59%
Type 3 worker 0.7594 0.9999 27.52%
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 0.2221 0.1584 -33.80%
Type 2 worker 0.2332 0.1767 -27.74%
Type 3 worker 0.2534 0.2045 -21.44%
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.4544 0.4498 -1.03%
Type 2 worker 0.5858 0.5459 -7.06%
Type 3 worker 0.8438 0.7383 -13.36%
Relative Consumption
Type 1 worker 1.0000 1.0783 7.54%
Type 2 worker 1.5718 1.6012 1.86%
Type 3 worker 2.6303 2.4883 -5.55%
Capital Stock 1.7108 1.7828 4.12%
Output 0.2265 0.2519 10.64%
Finally, overall output levels in the economy are signi￿cantly higher under
the lump-sum tax. Again, this is driven by the substantial change in the
structure of employment. Our experiment shows that changing the cost of
health insurance from one in which ￿rms pay on a per-worker basis to a lump-
sum tax generates an increase in steady-state output of 10.64 percent. Thus,
the distortion caused by the existing system of EBHI costs the U.S. economy
about $1.3 trillion (in 2006 dollars).
185.2.2 Universal coverage funded by a payroll tax
In this version of the model the per-worker cost of providing heath insurance is
again removed and replaced with a system whereby health insurance is ￿nanced
through a payroll tax. This version of the model allows us to analyze a more
realistic alternative for policy makers. In addition, ￿nancing health insurance
costs through a payroll tax also allows us to examine the e⁄ects of moving to a
healthcare system in which all individuals receive coverage. Note that unlike
the lump-sum experiment, the total cost burden to the economy increases in
this model as compared to the benchmark.
We estimate two tax schemes within this version of the model; one in which
￿rms are required to pay 100 percent of the payroll tax obligation, and a second
where the tax is split equally between both workers and ￿rms. Results from
these experiments are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Payroll Tax Results
When ￿rms pay ... When ￿rms pay ...
Variable Benchmark 100% of tax % Change 50% of tax % Change
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5463 0.8045 38.71% 0.7970 37.77%
Type 2 worker 0.6867 0.9999 37.59% 0.9999 37.59%
Type 3 worker 0.7594 0.9999 27.52 0.9999 27.52%
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 0.2221 0.1609 -32.18% 0.1603 -32.58%
Type 2 worker 0.2332 0.1689 -32.24% 0.1685 -32.51%
Type 3 worker 0.2534 0.1962 -25.60% 0.1957 -25.84%
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.454446 0.3520 -25.53% 0.3983 -13.19%
Type 2 worker 0.585800 0.4541 -25.47% 0.5130 -13.26%
Type 3 worker 0.843802 0.6122 -32.09% 0.6914 -19.92%
Relative Consumption
Type 1 worker 1.0000 0.8403 -17.40% 0.8269 -19.01%
Type 2 worker 1.5718 1.3322 -16.53% 1.3084 -18.34%
Type 3 worker 2.6303 2.0712 -23.90% 2.0328 -25.77%
Capital Stock 1.7108 1.5263 -11.41% 1.4996 -13.17%
Output 0.2265 0.2299 1.49% 0.2320 2.40%
As was the case under lump-sum ￿nancing, there is an increase in employ-
ment and a decrease in hours worked across all workers as compared to the
benchmark EBHI model. Again, this is to be expected since removing the
large ￿xed cost currently associated with employment (i.e. EBHI) gives ￿rms
the incentive to hire additional workers at less hours. The e⁄ect is greatest for
the low-skilled workers, resulting in a more equal distribution of both employ-
ment and wages. In addition, given the diminishing returns to hours in the
production function, the increase in employment and decrease in hours worked
19leads to an increase in productivity and overall output. By moving to a univer-
sal healthcare system and ￿nancing this system by a payroll tax, steady state
output could increase by 2.4 percent.
The increase in output is signi￿cantly smaller in the payroll-tax model than
in the lump-sum model. There are two primary reasons why the output growth
is lower in this case. First, the universal scheme ￿nanced through a payroll tax
does not eliminate the employment distortion completely; the lump-sum model
does. Second, since all workers now receive health insurance, the total costs
to the economy have increased. Given this, it is not surprising to see a more
modest increase in output.
The distributional e⁄ects under the payroll tax are similar to that of the
lump-sum model, though considerably more modest in magnitude. From the
results presented in Table 5 we can see that moving to a system of universal
healthcare ￿nanced by a payroll tax not only leads to an increase in overall out-
put, but an improvement in the relative equality of both wage and consumption
levels across all types of workers.5
6 Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed in the calibration section, estimates for search and hiring costs
di⁄er substantially across the literature. Low estimates are in the neighbor-
hood of 5 percent of total compensation costs, while upper bound estimates
are approximately 20 percent of total compensation. The benchmark model in
this paper is calibrated with non-compensation costs of employment equal to 10
percent. If the cost of hiring workers is in fact higher (or lower), then this will
a⁄ect ￿rms￿employment/hours worked decisions, and hence wages and output.
The following section explores the sensitivity of our benchmark results to the
calibration of hiring costs. We consider three possible levels of hiring costs: 5
percent, 15 percent and 20 percent.
Table 6 shows the impact of the lump-sum- and payroll-tax model experi-
ments when search and hiring costs equal 5 percent of total compensation (note
that the payroll tax results are from the model where the payroll tax burden is
split equally between workers and ￿rms). Compared to the benchmark results,
low hiring costs give ￿rms an incentive to hire relatively more workers for fewer
hours. As a result, wages decrease, leading to both lower savings and consump-
tion levels across all worker types. The decrease in savings leads directly to a
5Another interesting result of the payroll tax ￿nancing scheme is that the the distribution
of the tax burden itself does seem to impact the aggregate employment, hours worked, and
savings decision in the economy. This result seems to di⁄er from the traditional, well-known
result that it does not matter which side of the market is taxed, the incidence of the tax will
remain the same (Dalton￿ s￿Law). Research beginning with a seminal article by Harberger
(1962) however shows that in general equilibrium frameworks, e⁄ects in markets other than
those in which the tax is introduced are often very important. This clearly seems to be the
case here as changes in the distributuion of the payroll tax burden have signi￿cant e⁄ects on
savings, the capital-labor ratio, and hence on overall output. Additional research on who
bears the ultimate burden of this additional tax is left for future work.
20decrease in the overall capital stock. In fact, given almost a 33 percent average
decline in hours worked across all workers, payroll-tax ￿nancing of a universal
heathcare may actually lead to a small decrease in overall output in this case.
Table 6: Lump-Sum and Payroll Tax Results (with 5% hiring costs)
Variable Benchmark Lump Sum % Change Payroll Tax % Change
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5485 0.9565 55.61% 0.8684 45.95%
Type 2 worker 0.6856 0.9999 37.75% 0.9999 37.74%
Type 3 worker 0.7592 0.9999 27.55% 0.9999 27.54%
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 0.2221 0.1484 -40.32% 0.1497 -39.45%
Type 2 worker 0.2328 0.1730 -29.69% 0.1658 -33.94%
Type 3 worker 0.2524 0.2019 -22.32% 0.1932 -26.73%
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.4649 0.4379 -5.99% 0.3846 -18.96%
Type 2 worker 0.5948 0.5035 -16.66% 0.4657 -24.46%
Type 3 worker 0.8385 0.6595 -24.02% 0.6109 -31.67%
Relative Consumption
Type 1 worker 1.0000 1.0548 5.34% 0.8307 -18.55%
Type 2 worker 1.5572 1.4763 -7.36% 1.1552 -29.86%
Type 3 worker 2.5547 2.4220 -15.33% 1.7507 -37.79%
Capital Stock 1.6758 1.6538 -1.32% 1.3632 -20.65%
Output 0.2178 0.2360 8.04% 0.2132 -2.13%
But the majority of the recent data (and almost any conversation with busi-
ness executives) supports the fact that search and hiring costs are indeed sig-
ni￿cantly higher than this lower bound estimate. Table 7 shows the impact of
changing to both a lump-sum and payroll-tax scheme when search and hiring
costs equal 15 percent of total compensation. Compared with Table 6, the
higher costs in this version leads to lower employment rates and more hours
worked in both models. This leads to relatively higher wages, consumption
levels and savings across all worker types. Given the higher level of wages and
savings, the larger hiring costs lead to a larger increase in output than in the
benchmark (10 percent) case. Speci￿cally, output increases by as much as 12.43
percent and 2.68 percent in the lump-sum and payroll models, respectively.
21Table 7: Lump-Sum and Payroll Tax Results (with 15% hiring costs)
Variable Benchmark Lump Sum % Change Payroll Tax % Change
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5464 0.8296 41.76% 0.7519 31.93%
Type 2 worker 0.6867 0.9999 37.59% 0.9449 31.92%
Type 3 worker 0.7594 0.9999 27.52% 1.0000 27.52%
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 0.2223 0.1662 -29.08% 0.1687 -27.59%
Type 2 worker 0.2332 0.1766 -27.80% 0.1752 -28.60%
Type 3 worker 0.2533 0.2057 -20.82% 0.1971 -25.09%
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.4412 0.4461 1.10% 0.3954 -10.96%
Type 2 worker 0.5783 0.5773 -0.18% 0.5235 -9.96%
Type 3 worker 0.8478 0.7892 -7.16% 0.7412 -13.44%
Relative Consumption
Type 1 worker 1.0000 1.0984 9.39% 0.8441 -16.95%
Type 2 worker 1.5908 1.7318 8.49% 1.3650 -15.31%
Type 3 worker 2.7108 2.7220 0.41% 2.2400 -19.08%
Capital Stock 1.7342 1.8787 8.01% 1.5761 -9.56%
Output 0.2343 0.2653 12.43% 0.2407 2.68%
Finally, at the upper-end of the empirical estimates (Del Boca and Rota
1998), hiring costs could be as much as even 20 percent of total compensation.
These results are summarized in Table 8. Again, as expected, the higher costs
lead to lower employment levels, increased hours and wages, and hence increased
savings and output in the economy.
22Table 8: Lump-Sum and Payroll Tax Results (with 20% hiring costs)
Variable Benchmark Lump Sum % Change Payroll Tax % Change
Employment
Type 1 worker 0.5471 0.8020 38.25% 0.7255 28.22%
Type 2 worker 0.6854 0.9999 37.77% 0.9098 28.32%
Type 3 worker 0.7595 1.0000 27.51% 1.0000 27.51%
Hours Worked
Type 1 worker 0.2220 0.1712 -25.98% 0.1752 -23.67%
Type 2 worker 0.2330 0.1773 -27.32% 0.1818 -24.81%
Type 3 worker 0.2531 0.2071 -20.06^ 0.1996 -23.75%
Wages
Type 1 worker 0.4279 0.4399 2.77% 0.3877 -9.87%
Type 2 worker 0.5375 0.5978 10.63% 0.5256 -2.24%
Type 3 worker 0.8507 0.8242 -3.16% 0.7709 -9.85%
Relative Consumption
Type 1 worker 1.00 1.1043 9.92% 0.8510 -16.14%
Type 2 worker 1.6064 1.8156 12.24% 1.3921 -14.32%
Type 3 worker 2.7756 2.9098 4.72% 2.4035 -14.39%
Capital Stock 1.7615 1.9546 10.40% 1.6355 -7.42%
Output 0.2420 0.2784 14.01% 0.2516 3.89%
Comparing the results generated from the four di⁄erent estimates of search
and hiring costs (5, 10, 15 and 20 percent) reveals some interesting macroeco-
nomic consequences of healthcare reform. Ultimately, the e⁄ects of healthcare
reform on output and inequality are uncertain. Most of the models show that
steady state output would increase. The results also demonstrate that a move
to a single-payer, universal system can simultaneously increase output and de-
crease inequality. This occurred in both the 10- and 15-percent cases. But
there also appears to be a trade-o⁄ between the size of output growth and the
change in wage/comsumption inequality. The larger the output increase, the
smaller the decline in the wage/consumption gap between workers with di⁄erent
levels of human capital.
7 Conclusion
This paper has addressed the macroeconomic consequences of the way the
United States ￿nances health insurance. In the process we have addressed
to two fundamental questions: what are the macroeconomic costs of the U.S.￿ s
reliance on employer-based health insurance? and what would be the result of
changing to a universal system ￿nanced through a payroll tax? The answers
we have uncovered should have a signi￿cant impact on the future theoretical
work in this area as well as policy discussions.
First, this study makes clear that the current system results in a relatively
ine¢ cient allocation of labor resources. Since the costs associated with the
provision of insurance vary by employment, ￿rms respond by hiring fewer work-
ers at more hours. By changing the way health insurance is ￿nanced it is
23possible to permanently increase output and employment while reducing the
average hours worked. Employer-based systems also exacerbate wage inequal-
ity. When the costs of insurance are assumed to be equal across worker-types,
employer-based systems increase the incentive for ￿rms to raise the hours worked
by higher-skilled workers before hiring lower-skilled workers. But when these
costs are paid through either a lump-sum or payroll tax, employment increases
relatively more for the least-skilled workers. Theoretically, if the U.S. was able
to eliminate these labor-demand distortions, the resulting increase in steady
state output could be substantial.
Second, a single-payer, universal system ￿nanced through a payroll tax rep-
resents a feasible alternative to the present system. Payroll taxes are easy
to implement and the resulting labor market distortions are minimal. More-
over, under reasonable assumptions about labor costs, such a system is likely to
stimulate output and reduce inequality at the same time.
While the results of this study seem to have clear, albeit controversial, im-
plications for long-term healthcare and economic policy in the United States,
caution must be taken in interpreting their signi￿cance. First and foremost,
the estimates generated from this experiment only account for the demand-side
distortions. Because we assume all workers are willing to accept a job if o⁄ered,
many of the bene￿ts of universal healthcare coverage may be obscured. As a
result, a number of extensions to the model itself should be considered before
strong policy recommendations are made. For example, there is evidence that
poor women are less likely to enter the workforce under employer-based systems
for fear of losing government-sponsored services such as Medicaid (Yelowitz
1995). More careful modeling of the complexity of the labor supply decisions
that exist under employer-based systems is likely to be one of the more im-
portant avenues for future work in this area. Future work may also wish to
consider a wider array of alternative policy reforms than has been investigated
here, as this would allow for the discovery of the socially optimal tax ￿nancing
scheme.
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Age and E¢ ciency Distribution
Age Distribution E¢ ciency Age Distribution E¢ ciency
18 0.0241 0.3151 41 0.0258 1.0141
19 0.0241 0.3524 42 0.0258 1.0290
20 0.0235 0.3896 43 0.0258 1.0377
21 0.0235 0.4269 44 0.0258 1.0464
22 0.0235 0.4641 45 0.0221 1.0550
23 0.0235 0.5014 46 0.0221 1.0637
24 0.0235 0.5387 47 0.0221 1.0724
25 0.0243 0.5759 48 0.0221 1.0615
26 0.0243 0.6132 49 0.0221 1.0507
27 0.0243 0.6504 50 0.0171 1.0398
28 0.0243 0.6778 51 0.0171 1.0290
29 0.0243 0.7052 52 0.0171 1.0181
30 0.0280 0.7326 53 0.0171 1.0135
31 0.0280 0.7600 54 0.0171 1.0089
32 0.0280 0.7874 55 0.0137 1.0043
33 0.0280 0.8209 56 0.0137 0.9998
34 0.0280 0.8543 57 0.0137 0.9952
35 0.0286 0.8878 58 0.0137 0.9859
36 0.0286 0.9212 59 0.0137 0.9766
37 0.0286 0.9547 60 0.0122 0.9673
38 0.0286 0.9695 61 0.0122 0.9580
39 0.0286 0.9844 62 0.0122 0.9487
40 0.0258 0.9993
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